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HUPPERT, REILLY, AND THE INCREASING FUTILITY OF
RELYING ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROTECT
EMPLOYEE SPEECH

John Q. Mulligan*

INTRODUCTION
Advocates of expanded employee speech rights can be divided into two camps:
those who have examined the issue as an employment law matter deserving a statutory
solution,1 and those who have focused on the constitutional implications.2 The Supreme
Court’s ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos,3 has prompted a flood of commentary on the
constitutional aspect of the problem. The Court’s ruling that a prosecutor’s speech
was not protected by the First Amendment rested on the flawed proposition that when
individuals speak pursuant to the duties of their employment, they are not speaking as
citizens.4 The problems inherent with the Court’s line-drawing have been brought into
acute relief by the attempts of lower courts to apply Garcetti’s “pursuant to duties” test,
most noticeably in the current circuit court split over whether a police officer testifying
before a grand jury is speaking in fulfillment of his duties as an officer or his duties as
a citizen.5
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2011.
1
See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237 (2009); Frank J.
Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A Comparative
Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543 (2004); David C. Yamada,
Voices From the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee Speech in the PostIndustrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1998).
2
See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution
to a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115; Ruben Garcia, Against Legislation:
Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protection for Public Employees, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 22 (2008); Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691 (2009); Helen Norton, Constraining Public
Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression,
59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009).
3
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
4
Id. at 421.
5
Compare Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that
a police officer’s grand jury testimony is protected because it is speech made pursuant to his
duties as a citizen), with Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that a police officer’s grand jury testimony was not protected because it was made
pursuant to his duties as a public employee).
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Critics of Garcetti have rightly derided the decision for reasons both philosophical6
and policy-driven.7 However, these reasons apply just as readily to private-sector
employees, who have even less free speech rights at work than their public sector
counterparts.8 While many critics have proposed constitutional solutions for protecting
public employee speech rights,9 the Constitution is severely limited as a vehicle for
protecting employee speech.10
This Note will argue that the complicated balancing of interests inherent in the
employer-employee relationship could better be accomplished by a statutory scheme
that would have the significant advantage of protecting the speech of all employees,
not just those in the public sector. Part I of this Note will provide a brief history of the
constitutional protections for public employee speech to demonstrate how case law
arrived at its current point. It will culminate with a discussion of the circuit court split
created by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Reilly v. City of Atlantic
City11 and the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Huppert v. City of
Pittsburg.12 In Part II, the Note will argue that the constitutional jurisprudence in this
area has become untenable. It will go on to discuss all of the problems inherent with
attempting to protect employee speech through constitutional means, paying particular
attention to the exclusion of private employees from those protections. Part III will
discuss the potential of current statutory and state common-law protections for both
public and private employees to serve as a model for a comprehensive federal statute.
Finally, in Part IV, the Note will propose, as a solution, a comprehensive federal statute to protect employee speech. Part IV will discuss some of the drawbacks to and
counter arguments against comprehensive statutory protection for employee speech,
6

See, e.g., Julie A. Wenell, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Stifling the First Amendment in the
Public Workplace, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (2007) (arguing public employees should
not have to abandon their constitutional rights upon entering work).
7
E.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983:
A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008) (arguing that failure to protect
public employees’ speech removes a valuable source of information about government corruption and malfeasance, and leaves public whistleblowers open to retaliation).
8
BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE 63 (2007).
9
See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 2 (arguing that employees should be protected from retaliation for their speech through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution); Garcia, supra note 2 (arguing that Garcetti’s holding could be narrowed to its
facts); Wenell, supra note 6 (arguing that the bright-line tests in Garcetti and Connick should
be replaced by a return to the Pickering balancing test).
10
While many of the issues discussed in this Note are applicable to all types of employee
speech, this Note will focus on the speech represented by the Pickering line of cases, involving
employee speech that criticizes or exposes wrongs within the workplace. There are other
examples, such as off-duty employee political or religious speech which the First Amendment
may be better suited to protect.
11
532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
12
574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
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but conclude that a federal statute offers the best hope for preserving speech rights
within both the public and private workplace.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR EMPLOYEE SPEECH
A. History of First Amendment Cases
For a long time, the speech of public employees was no more protected against
employer retaliation than that of private-sector employees. The prevailing attitude
of courts was most famously illustrated by Oliver Wendell Holmes’s observation in
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,13 that “[a policeman] may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”14 That line
of thinking first began to erode during the middle of the twentieth century. In response
to McCarthy era anticommunist measures, the Court began to limit the government’s
ability to place restrictions on public employment.15 Over a series of cases, the Court
held that public employers could not force employees to swear oaths of loyalty16 or
deny employment because of prior political affiliations.17
Pickering v. Board of Education18 was the first case to recognize that a public
employer’s retaliation against a public employee for making political statements was
a violation of the employee’s First Amendment rights.19 In Pickering, a school
teacher was fired for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school board
and district superintendent.20 The Supreme Court found the firing to be unconstitutional, equating dismissal from public employment with other forms of government
speech restrictions.21
Justice Marshall, in Pickering, recognized that the issue depended in part on
whether the teacher’s speech was classified as that of an employee or a citizen.22 He
did not, however, indicate, as the Court later would in Garcetti, that the two roles
were mutually exclusive. He wrote, “The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
13

29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
Id.
15
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE
MCCARTHY ERA 174–75 (2005).
16
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
17
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
18
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
19
Id. at 573–75.
20
Id. at 564.
21
Id. at 574. (“While criminal sanctions and damage awards have a somewhat different
impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech . . . the threat of dismissal from public
employment is nonetheless a potent means of inhibiting speech.”).
22
Id. (“[I]n a case . . . in which the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public communication . . . it is necessary to regard the
teacher as the member of the general public he seeks to be.”).
14
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between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.”23 This suggests a dual status
in which employees retain their free speech rights as citizens, but subject those rights
to some restrictions within the workplace.
Marshall’s language came to be known as the “Pickering balancing test.”24 The
test was used when deciding whether a public employer’s punishment of an employee’s
speech constituted a violation of the employee’s First Amendment rights.25 Certain
factors favoring the employee’s right to make the speech in question were balanced
against the employer’s need to exert control over the workplace.26
The Court first began to show discomfort with relying solely on the Pickering
balancing test in Connick v. Myers.27 That case concerned an Assistant District Attorney who was terminated for distributing a questionnaire to other district attorneys
regarding policies in the office where she worked.28 The Supreme Court, concerned
that “government offices could not function if every employment decision became a
constitutional matter,”29 sought to draw a bright-line rule to keep such cases involving
internal workplace disputes out of the courts. The Court held that in order for an
employee’s speech to be protected and qualify for the balancing test described in
Pickering, the speech had to be on a “matter[] of public concern.”30 The Court made
clear that it was concerned about keeping the judiciary out of the role of micromanaging
employer-employee relationships by stating that “government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary
in the name of the First Amendment.”31
Though the Court supported its reasoning with practical considerations, the line
drawn in Connick indicated a crucial departure from Pickering. Where Pickering
held that the First Amendment applied to all employee speech subject to certain permissible restrictions, the Court in Connick cordoned off a certain type of employee
speech—speech that did not involve matters of public concern—as unreachable by
23

Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
E.g., Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free
Speech Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 46 DUQ. L.
REV. 133, 135 (2008).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 135–36. Oluwole lists several factors including the speech’s impact on workplace
harmony and discipline, whether the speech depended on inside information, and the
employee’s interest in commenting on matters of public concern. The author also provides
a helpful diagram of the Pickering factors. Id. at 176.
27
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
28
Id. at 141.
29
Id. at 143.
30
Id. at 145.
31
Id. at 146.
24
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the First Amendment. The Court’s line-drawing in Connick foreshadowed the even
stricter threshold test that was to come.
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos
Garcetti v. Ceballos32 involved a deputy district attorney who wrote a memo that
expressed concern over inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant
and recommended dismissal of the investigation.33 When his supervisors decided
to proceed with the case, he testified for the defense attorney regarding his concerns.34
He was later reassigned, transferred, and passed over for promotion.35 He sued, claiming that the subsequent employment actions were retaliation for his memorandum
and testimony regarding the affidavit.36 The Supreme Court held that Ceballos’s memo
was not protected speech because it was made “pursuant to [his] official duties.”37
The Court’s holding implied that a person’s status as a citizen could be absorbed
by his or her status as an employee and the legal rights that accompany citizenship
could thus disappear. As Justice Kennedy wrote, “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”38
In finding as it did, the Court reiterated many of the same concerns that had motivated its decision in Connick.39 The Court drew a line between the rights of a citizen
and those of an employee in order to curb the degree to which the Constitution, and
by extension, the judiciary, interferes with employers’ right to manage their employees.40 The “pursuant to duties” language was immediately interpreted as a bright-line
rule that a plaintiff must satisfy before the Pickering factors could be considered.41
In creating this test, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority ignored the possibility that when public employees speak or act in the course of their employment, they
might be motivated as much by their responsibilities to society as citizens as they
are by their duties to their employer, a point Justice Souter raised in his dissent.42
32

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 414.
34
Id. at 414–15.
35
Id. at 415.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 421.
38
Id. (emphasis added).
39
See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
40
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419, 422–23.
41
See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of
Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 123 (2008).
42
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 432 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he very idea of categorically
separating the citizen’s interest from the employee’s interest ignores the fact that the ranks
33
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Government employees in particular purport to serve both their employers and the
general public.43 This duality of purpose has led one author, Richard R. Carlson, to
begin referring to such individuals as “citizen employees,” and to suggest they be
considered a separate class of employee, possessing rights deserving of protection.44
The overlap between the role of a citizen and the role of an employee, and the dichotomy of Garcetti’s “pursuant to duties” test imposed on those roles, became a critical
issue in two subsequent cases.
C. Post-Garcetti Jurisprudence
One of the major criticisms45 of Garcetti is that, despite introducing a new test, the
Court left significant latitude as to the application of that test by failing to define what
it meant by “pursuant to his official duties.”46 Ceballos did not dispute that he wrote
his memo pursuant to his official duties.47 This allowed the Court to avoid having
“to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s
duties . . . where there is room for serious debate.”48 The Court did, however, indicate
that a written description of the employee’s job duties would not be dispositive and
that a “practical” inquiry by the fact finder would be required.49 This lack of definition
has led to confusion in the lower courts, as well as in public-sector workplaces, as to
when an employee is speaking as a citizen and when he or she is speaking as an
employee. This confusion is best highlighted by the split between the Third and
Ninth Circuits regarding whether testifying before a grand jury is pursuant to a police
officer’s duties.50
In Reilly v. City of Atlantic City,51 Officer Reilly of the Atlantic City Police
Department testified against another officer in a police corruption trial. When he was
later forced into retirement through threat of demotion, he sued, claiming he had been
retaliated against for his testimony.52 The Third Circuit implied that Officer Reilly’s
of public service include those who share the poet’s ‘object . . . to unite [m]y avocation and
my vocation.’”).
43
Id. at 431–32.
44
Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees and Anti-Retaliation Law, in RETALIATION AND
WHISTLEBLOWERS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 60TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
ON LABOR 653 (Paul Secunda & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2009).
45
Sonya Bice, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se
Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence of Connick’s Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech
Partition, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 45, 66 (2007).
46
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
47
Id. at 424.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Compare Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008), with Huppert v. City
of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
51
532 F.3d 216.
52
Id. at 220–23.
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trial testimony could be accurately categorized as both pursuant to his official job
duties, and as the act of a citizen.53 Despite the fact that Officer Reilly’s trial testimony
resulted from his official duties related to the corruption investigation, the court determined that his testimony was protected speech. It stated that “the act of offering
truthful testimony is the responsibility of every citizen, and the First Amendment protection associated with fulfilling that duty of citizenship is not vitiated by one’s status
as a public employee.”54 The court reasoned that declaring truthful testimony to be
protected employee speech adheres to the “principles discussed in Garcetti” by advancing “individual and societal interests.”55
The Reilly case serves as a perfect example of the overlap between citizen speech
and employee speech, in part because the Third Circuit’s depiction of truthful testimony
as a duty belonging to any citizen, not just a police officer, was seemingly inescapable.
Characterizing certain speech as employee speech and not citizen speech is a matter
of semantics. The overlap the Third Circuit recognized in Reilly could easily be found
in most employee speech cases. However, in Reilly, the court found it significant that
the specific type of speech at issue (grand jury testimony) was required of citizens.56
The court could not blindly follow Garcetti’s description of employee and citizen
speech as two separate classes in the face of such obvious evidence to the contrary.
The court extricated itself from this difficult predicament the best it could by suggesting
that when a public employee has a duty to speak both as a citizen and as an employee,
the speech no longer “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities,”57 and thus, falls under the protective umbrella of the First Amendment.58
When an individual has a social responsibility to speak regardless of his or her job
duties, it cannot be said with certainty that the speech was caused by his or her employment. The facts of Reilly expose the most significant flaw with Garcetti’s distinction
between employee speech and citizen speech: in the cases most likely to come before the courts, such as those involving whistleblowing, an employee who speaks out
against his or her government employer is likely to be acting simultaneously as an
employee and a citizen.
Despite the seeming inescapability of the Third Circuit’s conclusion in Reilly, the
Ninth Circuit, given a nearly identical set of facts, managed to come to the opposite
53

Id. at 228–31.
Id. at 231.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 228 (“It is axiomatic that ‘[e]very citizen . . . owes to his society the duty of giving
testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law.’” (quoting Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S.
556, 559 n.2 (1961))).
57
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
58
Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231 (“When a government employee testifies truthfully, s/he is not
simply performing his or her job duties, rather, the employee is acting as a citizen and is bound
by the dictates of the court and the rules of evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423)).
54
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conclusion in Huppert v. City of Pittsburg.59 The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to
follow Reilly.60 The court cited a California appellate court decision which listed the
act of testifying about facts that will incriminate any person as among a police officer’s
duties in California.61 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit seemingly misstated the Third
Circuit’s holding by claiming the Third Circuit “took a swift turn to conclude that
truthful testimony is never part of a police officer’s duties.”62
The Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of Reilly ignored the Third Circuit’s nuanced observation that truthful testimony is a duty that exists both inside and outside of public
employment, and is therefore not predicated on public employment. In its favor, the
Ninth Circuit’s application of the Garcetti test appears to be the more literal and clear
cut of the two Circuit opinions. It is clear that testifying in the corruption cases was
pursuant to the officer’s duties in both cases and for the Ninth Circuit that is where
the analysis ended.63
II. PROBLEMS WITH RELYING ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROTECT
EMPLOYEE SPEECH
The Reilly and Huppert decisions illustrate the logical flaws, applicability problems,
and unfair results that have led many to call for the overturn of the Garcetti standard,64
and even have inspired legislation to that effect.65 However, the Garcetti decision is
merely symptomatic of the real problem: relying on the Constitution to solve this
important and complicated employment law issue, which is much better suited for
a legislative solution.
Perhaps because speech is protected by the First Amendment,66 and because the
notion of “free speech” is arguably our most widely known and revered constitutional
right,67 it is assumed that any infringement on speech has to be constitutional. The
59

574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 708.
61
Id. at 707 (citing Christal v. Police Comm’n of S.F., 92 P.2d 416, 419 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1939)).
62
Id. at 708.
63
Id. (arguing that the Third Circuit’s determination that testifying was pursuant to Reilly’s
duties should have been dispositive, but that “[b]y first finding that Reilly’s speech was pursuant
to his job duties, but subsequently concluding that it was protected by the First Amendment, the
Reilly court impermissibly began chipping away at the plain holding in Ceballos”).
64
See Secunda, supra note 41, at 143–44.
65
Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1767
n.66 (2007) (“Senate Bill 494 was passed as an amendment to the 2007 National Defense
Authorization Act, 96-0 on June 22, 2006. The Senate bill was passed to overturn the Supreme
Court decision of Garcetti v. Ceballos.”).
66
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
67
See, e.g., Searcey v. Crim, 681 F. Supp. 821, 826 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Sean Hannity,
Foreword to BRIAN JENNINGS, CENSORSHIP: THE THREAT TO SILENCE TALK RADIO, at xv
60
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notion that speech would be better protected through any other means is anathema
to those who hold the notion of free speech as a sacred right held on a pedestal high
above the rights secured by mere statute.68 But sentiment aside, Garcetti exposes
some of the inherent difficulties in relying on the First Amendment to protect speech
inside the workplace. An inadequate bright-line test, such as the one created in
Garcetti, was the inevitable result of applying the broad language of the First Amendment to the thorny problem of employee speech. In Part II, this Note will argue that
the rights-based approach of First Amendment litigation is flawed as a framework
for employee speech protections because of Garcetti, the Court’s concerns about
managerial imperative and docket control, and the lack of protections the First Amendment affords private employees.
A. Untenability of the Garcetti Standard
Through its strict interpretation of the “pursuant to duties” test,69 the Huppert decision clearly demonstrates the logical fallacy underpinning Garcetti’s distinction between speech made as a citizen and speech made as an employee. In just four years,
it has become increasingly untenable for the Court to continue to pretend that public
employees are never acting as citizens when they are performing their work duties.
Some authors have advocated that the Supreme Court solve the contradiction
apparent in Huppert and Reilly by creating a rule that trial testimony always be considered protected speech.70 While this solution would remedy the specific issue causing
the current circuit split, it ignores the greater problem that Huppert and Reilly symbolize: the faulty premise on which the “pursuant to duties” test is based.
The split between the Ninth and Third Circuits demonstrates that the “pursuant to
duties” test is not just logically inconsistent, it is difficult to apply. It also illustrates
some of the main problems with the “pursuant to official duties” test’s ability to achieve
the goals behind the First Amendment’s protections. The Supreme Court admitted
in Garcetti that those goals extended beyond mere protection of an individual’s right
of expression, to include protection of the public’s interest in hearing certain types
of information.71 Corruption in public agencies and other forms of government malfeasance would ostensibly be a clear example of the types of information the public
has an interest in hearing. However, when prosecuting public corruption is essentially part of an officer’s job duties as the Ninth Circuit ruled, then the Garcetti test
(2009); Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against
the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 344 (2008).
68
See Garcia, supra note 2, at 27 (describing constitutional rights as “rights that transcend
the domestic legislative sphere”).
69
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009).
70
E.g., Scott E. Michael, “Lie or Lose Your Job!” Protecting A Public Employee’s Rights
to Testify Truthfully, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 411 (2006).
71
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2005).
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does not accomplish the goals of protecting the kind of public whistleblowing most
valuable to society.72
The ambiguity in a narrow interpretation might hold that speech only owes its
existence to a public employee’s responsibilities when that speech is mandated by those
responsibilities. This allows for more nuanced opinions, like that of Reilly, where the
police officer’s speech was protected because he would have had a duty to testify as a
citizen regardless of whether he was a public employee.73 By contrast, a broad interpretation, such as the one the Ninth Circuit seemingly uses in Huppert, suggests that
speech owes its existence to a public employee’s responsibilities whenever the situation
or subject matter that occasioned the speech was initiated by the speaker’s employment.
Such an interpretation reasons that, regardless of any duty to testify Officer Huppert
may have had as a citizen, he never would have been in a position to testify on the
matter if it were not for his employment as an officer. One can see how this application
of the Garcetti test has the potential to nearly swallow the First Amendment protections
whole, as the overwhelming majority of cases will involve public employees speaking
on matters in some way connected to their employment, about which they would
likely be uninformed were it not for their position.74
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling places public employees in untenable
positions. Police officers in Huppert’s position are forced into the unfortunate Catch-22
of having to choose between testifying before a grand jury and being retaliated against
or refusing to testify and being held in contempt.75 Other public employees face a
similar paradox in seeking ways to express their concerns in a way that is outside
of their duties, and thus protected, and yet not so detrimental to their employer as to
damage their chances of winning on the Pickering balancing test.76 Commentators have
been quick to pick up on the fact that despite the Supreme Court’s suggestion that
internal mechanisms can be created for employees to voice protected concerns outside
of their official duties, the majority of case law since Garcetti has led to the conclusion
that complaints made to public bodies outside of the employer such as newspapers or
congressmen are more likely to be considered protected speech than complaints made
to persons within one’s employer.77 This has created what some have dubbed a “perverse incentive” for public employees to report any concerns they have directly to
outside agents such as the press, instead of to superiors or internal compliance officers,
to ensure that their speech will be protected and that they will not be retaliated against.78
Some have even pointed out that public employees who complain to outside sources
72

Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
74
Raj Chohan, Tenth Circuit Interpretations of Garcetti: Limits on First Amendment
Protections for Whistle-Blowers, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 573, 588–89 (2008).
75
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 722 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
76
See Oluwole, supra note 24, at 135.
77
See Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1323 (2007).
78
Chohan, supra note 74, at 595.
73
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may succeed in meeting the Garcetti test and ensure that their speech is protected;
however, they might ultimately have a harder time of succeeding on the Pickering
balancing test because such public criticisms are more damaging and disruptive to a
public employer’s business, and the public employer arguably has a greater interest
in preventing that kind of employee speech and a stronger argument for retaliation.79
B. Managerial Imperative and Docket Control
The Supreme Court expressed two primary motivations behind its decisions to
limit the category of speech by public employees eligible for protection. Both reflect
the Court’s wariness about extending constitutional rights within the work place. The
Court’s first concern was that to subject every instance in which an employee is disciplined for a comment made at work to the Pickering balancing test would result in
endless litigation by essentially “constitutionalizi[ng] . . . employee grievance[s].”80
The Court’s second, and more significant, concern was that the judiciary should not
be interfering with the management role of the government employer in relation to
its employee.81
The Court’s concern about the potential for employee speech cases to suddenly
overwhelm the judicial docket appears overstated. As Justice Souter predicted in his
dissent,82 and subsequent case law attests,83 the Garcetti rule has hardly lessened the
burden on courts in adjudicating employee speech cases. Instead of simply analyzing
cases under the Pickering balancing test, courts are now forced to perform a “practical
inquiry” to determine the scope of an employee’s official duties, and then may still
have to apply the Pickering test in the end.84 The circuit split between Reilly and
Huppert demonstrates how complicated such a “practical inquiry” can be, and how
courts can come to different conclusions applying the test to almost identical facts.85
This uncertainty leads to increased litigation as lower courts, unsure of how to apply
the legal standard, refuse to grant summary judgment and allow the parties to litigate
the question of what constitute an employee’s official duties.86 Uncertainty over the
79

Bice, supra note 45, at 51, 81–83.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
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Garcetti decision).
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See supra Part I.C.
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“pursuant to duties” test also has the potential to chill valued employee speech, as
employees have less certainty that their remarks will be protected.87
Concerns about courts interfering with government employers’ managerial functions may not be as easily disposed of. Though some view the “pursuant to duties”
test as nothing more than the current Court’s preference for line-drawing,88 Lawrence
Rosenthal has persuasively made the case that the Supreme Court’s purpose in Garcetti
was to carve out a new class of speech built on the notion of “managerial prerogative.”89 This new class of speech would not be subject to strict First Amendment
scrutiny.90 If this is the case, attempts to chip away at Garcetti’s edges may end up
being rebuked by further line-drawing from a Supreme Court wishing to clarify and
solidify its Garcetti holding.
Another interpretation of the Court’s rationale in Garcetti is that a public employer has a right to control its employees’ “work product.”91 According to the Court,
Ceballos would not have written his memo had it not been his official duty to write
such memos, and therefore the memo does not constitute protected speech.92 This
would fit Rosenthal’s “managerial prerogative” narrative93 and highlights a major problem with constitutional solutions. The uniqueness of the employer’s interest in controlling employee speech conflicts starkly with traditional notions of First Amendment
rights. Rather than create a false scenario where employees are not citizens or acting
as citizens when at work, the Court should recognize that the workplace is a situation where employer’s interests counteract that of employees such that standard First
Amendment considerations do not apply.
C. Failure to Protect Private Employees
Though Garcetti’s bright-line test has numerous flaws, the biggest problem with
a constitutional solution cannot be attributed to the Garcetti decision at all: First
Amendment protections do not apply to private employees. The First Amendment
87

BARRY, supra note 8, at 100.
See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an
Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1202 (2007) (“All of
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Id. at 89.
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Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (“Refusing to recognize First Amendment
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explicitly prohibits the federal government and, via incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment,94 state governments from interfering with citizens’ free speech
rights.95 It does not, however, prohibit private citizens from interfering with the speech
rights of other citizens.96 This distinction is known as the state action doctrine.97 As
such, private-sector employers can restrict the speech of their employees without
running afoul of the First Amendment.98
Most private employees are at-will employees, meaning they can be fired at any
time without cause.99 Private employees are entirely reliant on statutes, such as
Sarbanes-Oxley100 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,101 and state common law102 for
protection from their employers.103
Some commentators have suggested that the state action doctrine has become
obsolete, and should be abolished.104 The reasoning is that constitutional rights should
not be viewed as protections merely from government, but rights that cannot be abrogated by fellow citizens as well.105 As Bruce Barry writes, “[t]he division between
private action and state action is built on a kind of myth. . . . [T]o say that there is
no state action in my private behavior is to ignore how government makes it possible
for me to pursue my private behavior.”106 Criticisms of the state action doctrine have
become especially relevant over the last few decades as federal and state agencies
have trended toward privatizing traditionally public functions, such as services related
to tax collection, welfare, public works, education, corrections, national defense and
even government litigation.107
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100
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However, the state action doctrine is such an ingrained part of constitutional jurisprudence that overturning it would have countless ramifications and would likely
increase litigation to such an extent that its repeal is highly unlikely in the near future.
Assuming the state action doctrine remains in effect, there is no way for the employee
speech rights at issue in Huppert, Reilly or Garcetti to be extended to private employees. This is a major drawback to relying on the Constitution to advance employee
speech rights. Private sector employees make up eighty-four percent of the workforce, compared to the approximately sixteen percent represented by the public
sector.108 As a result, private employers exert tremendous influence over Americans’
everyday lives, are central to the national economy, and play a large role in shaping
public policy.109
If the purpose of the First Amendment is, as Thomas Emerson said, “to assure
an effective system of freedom of expression in a democratic society,”110 then how can
that system be effective if freedom of expression is not assured within both the public
and the private workplace? The workplace has increasingly become the place where
most adults “devote significant portions of their waking lives, and where many forge
the personal ties with other adults through which they construct their civic selves.”111
The drafters of the First Amendment concerned themselves primarily with protecting
citizens from the threat of a large, powerful, oppressive government. At the time, they
did not contemplate the similar dangers that might be posed by private entities that
would grow to equal the government in size and control over the everyday lives of
citizens. In seeking to repair the damage to First Amendment protections caused by
Garcetti, it would be unfair to ignore the lack of protections offered to private employees. Extending protections to both public and private-sector employees requires
looking beyond the Constitution for solutions.
III. CURRENT STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Much of the criticism surrounding Garcetti has focused on the “pursuant to duties”
test’s implications for governmental whistleblowers.112 Critics fear that not only will
civic-minded employees face unfair penalties for speaking out against government
malfeasance, but the public will be denied access to valuable information.113 Justice
108
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Id. at 8.
112
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Kennedy attempted to address this concern by suggesting such employees could rely
on the existing statutory protections.114 Part III will survey current whistleblower
statutes and consider whether they might offer a viable model for protecting employee
speech without relying on the First Amendment.
A. Federal Protections
Federal employees who speak critically of their employers are partially protected
through the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA),115 in conjunction with the
Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002
(No FEAR Act).116 The WPA protects public employees and applicants for employment against reprisal for reporting: “(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation;
or (B) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”117 The Act created the Office
of Special Counsel specifically to investigate claims brought under the Act.118 The
No FEAR Act adopts the same language and strengthens the preventative effect of
the WPA, by forcing individual government agencies to pay for any judgments
awarded employees who bring successful antiretaliation claims out of the agencies’
own budgets.119
Federal protections for private employees consist mostly of provisions attached
to separate legislative acts.120 Examples include the Occupational Safety and Health
Act121 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.122 These provisions typically prohibit
retaliation against employees who report the particular types of violations made illegal
by the statute they are attached to.123 This has created precisely the kind of piecemeal
protections Justice Souter and others criticized in regards to the Garcetti decision.124
In order to expand these existing protections beyond their narrow scope, reformers need
to focus their attention on a comprehensive federal statute.
114
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Id. § 1211.
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Litigation, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 49 n.241 (2003).
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Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1602 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78
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Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq. (2006)).
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That attention started to come in the wake of the Enron scandal, which caused great
harm to shareholders, employee pensions and the economy as a whole.125 Congress
recognized how damaging corporate malfeasance could be and how much harm would
have been avoided had an employee informed the public of Enron’s fraudulent activities
earlier. As a direct result, the first federal statute passed specifically in response to a
recognized need to encourage whistleblowing within a particular private industry was
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).126 SOX protects employees of publicly held
corporations against retaliation for cooperating or providing information to a federal
agent or internal investigator regarding violations of federal securities law.127 In that
way, SOX is often looked to as a starting point for potential future comprehensive
private employee protections. As with the WPA, SOX has been criticized for its narrow definitions of whistleblowing.128 However, it has served as a valuable example
of what effect such a statute can have, and provided insight into how it can be improved upon.129
B. State Employee Speech Protections
In a 2007 article,130 Richard Carlson broke state whistleblower protections down
into three types: those with fairly comprehensive common-law protections for whistleblowers, those with comprehensive statutory protections, and those (the majority) with
neither. States with strong common-law protections include California and Ohio,131
where an employee may state a cause of action for wrongful retaliation if:
(1) [T]here is a clear public policy manifested in a state or federal
constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common
law; (2) The employer discharged the employee under circumstances that jeopardize the public policy; (3) The employer was
motivated by conduct related to the public policy; and (4) The
employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification for
the dismissal.132

125
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29 U.S.C.).
127
Id.
128
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of
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This prohibition against employers who fire employees under circumstances related
to and motivated by public policy violations has great potential as a model for statutory
protections for employee speech. If we want to protect all employee speech that the
public might find beneficial as opposed to the narrow categories of speech protected by
whistleblower statutes such as the WPA,133 then it makes sense to define the subject
matter of the speech being protected more broadly by using a term such as “public
policy.” Here, an employee would not have to be reporting a violation of the law for
his or her speech to be protected. Any speech by an employee that called attention to
an employer’s violation of public policy would presumably be protected. Unfortunately, one of the drawbacks of the broad language is that courts have narrowed “public
policy” in application to primarily apply to statutory violations.134 However, a statutory
construction of this common-law rule would not have to share the same problem, as
Congress could make it clear how broadly it wished the protections to apply, and courts
would presumably defer to that legislative intent when applying the statutes.135
The other interesting aspect of Ohio and California’s common-law rules is the consideration given to the employer’s motivation.136 This is in contrast to the Supreme
Court’s Garcetti and Connick decisions, which focused on the employee’s motivation
in making the speech.137 This shift in emphasis offers an attractive alternative to the
current Constitutional model. Were courts to conduct an investigation into what actually motivated the employee’s dismissal, they might find that the employee was disciplined to prevent the dissemination of information that would be beneficial to the
public. In those cases, the argument for a free speech violation would seem stronger.
Courts could bypass the complicated question of what caused the employee speech,
and find that a First Amendment violation exists if the employer’s action was intended
to thwart a First Amendment objective.
State whistleblower statutes vary widely. Eighteen states have statutes that cover
both public and private employees.138 Some states’ statutes apply only to public employees,139 while other states still lack statutory protections of any kind.140 The most
comprehensive of the statutory protections can be found in New Jersey, Oregon and
Montana.141 New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act142 for example,
133
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protects an employee’s opposition to activity the employee
reasonably believes (1) is in violation of a law or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to a law . . . , (2) is fraudulent or
criminal; or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public
policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.143
IV. STATUTORY SOLUTION—COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE
SPEECH PROTECTIONS
Prohibiting persons from suffering unfair consequences from speech they have
made, and protecting society’s access to information of public interest, are interests the
First Amendment was intended to serve.144 Both of these interests could be protected
by statute as, and arguably more, effectively than by reference to the First Amendment.
The majority of other employee interests are protected by statute,145 even if there are
logical constitutional avenues. The most obvious and apt example is the Title VII antidiscrimination law.146 Discrimination in employment could arguably be deemed unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.147 However,
Congress instead passed the Title VII anti-discrimination statute, and employees have
effectively relied upon that statute for protection from and retaliation for workplace
discrimination since its passage.148 There is no reason to believe a national anti-retaliation statute, modeled after Title VII, and like Title VII, passed under Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, could not be equally as effective.
A. Advantages of Statutory Protections
A comprehensive federal statute offers three advantages over First Amendment
litigation as a means of protecting employee speech: incrementalism, flexibility and
protection for private as well as public employees.
One of the foremost problems of protecting employee speech through the First
Amendment is the slippery slope concept. Once the Court recognizes that any action
taken by a government employer to curtail the speech of its employees is a First
Amendment infringement, where does it draw the line? How does the Court extract
143
Carlson supra note 44, at 674–75 (citing New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection
Act § 34:19-3).
144
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U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq. (2006)).
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from the language of the First Amendment what speech public employees have a
“right” to and when that “right” is subordinate to their employers’ interest in maintaining control over the work place? In Garcetti the majority professed sympathy for the
need to protect employees that expose government corruption,149 but was noticeably
spooked by the hypothetical impact expansion of First Amendment rights could have
on the balance of power between employees and employers.150 A federal employee
speech statute could draw a line between whistleblower protections, which all employees should be entitled to, and the more nebulous ramifications of the First Amendment in the workplace that so concerned the majority in Garcetti.151 A comprehensive
statute could clearly define the exact types and instances of speech deserving protection
so that courts could apply the statute without having to worry about finding a constitutional right that grants employees too much freedom and that would be difficult to
undo later.
Setting aside the concern over exposing corruption and illegality, the Garcetti
decision becomes much less problematic because the stakes are much lower. Employee
rights advocates will frame the issue as whether public employees are being forced to
surrender their rights to criticize the government upon taking public employment.152
Proponents of limiting the amount of protected speech will contend that a government
employee has no greater right to criticize his or her employer than a private employee.153 Regardless, the issue can be argued without carrying the extra burden of
protecting the social good that comes when insiders expose government malfeasance.
The second advantage of a statutory scheme is that it offers the ability to tailor
statutory protections to best accomplish the purposes of whistleblower laws. Treating
protections against retaliatory measures for employee speech as a First Amendment
149
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150
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statement of Richard Ceballos, Deputy District Attorney, County of Los Angeles, California))).
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(2007). Moss argues that one of the arguments against public employee speech rights contained
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issue requires viewing the issue through what Orly Lobel has called a “rights-based
lens.”154 Rights-based approaches are less accommodating of exceptions and nuance,
as supporters of the right are hard-pressed to explain why whistleblowing can be a
fundamental right in some instances, but not others.155 A statutory scheme offers the
chance to start from scratch. Instead of deciding what protections are most in keeping
with the Constitution, lawmakers can decide what should be protected and simply write
it in. Cases so far have shown that protecting whistleblowers is a complex issue, involving questions about what types of complaints should be protected, whether internal
or external whistleblowing should be protected, and what types of employer responses
should be punished.156 Crafting a statutory scheme will offer the chance to discuss all
of the facets of employee speech, and design protections based not on what the constitutional framers intended or past case law dictates, but based solely on what would
be most effective and desirable to society.
The ability to tailor an employee speech statute to meet specific policy objectives
is perhaps best illustrated by the ongoing debate over incentives for whistleblowers.157
Multiple scholars have advocated for incentives in future whistleblower statutes because
studies suggest incentives are more successful than protections in persuading whistleblowers to come forward with valuable public information.158 Similarly creative
solutions to complicated employee speech issues are not available through First Amendment litigation.
The final advantage to a statutory scheme is that, unlike the First Amendment,
statutory protections can protect private employees.159 The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
amounted to an admission by Congress that private whistleblowers could be as important to the national welfare and as deserving of protection as their public counterparts.
Most advocates of constitutional protections for public employees are presumably also
in favor of statutory protections for private employees, and would suggest that protections are not an either-or proposition. It makes little sense to devote the time and
resources to fight for employee rights on behalf of the 21 million public sector
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employees160 while ignoring the approximately 108 million employees who work in
the private sector.161
Kennedy’s opinion in Garcetti suggests that he intended to separate the issue of
whistleblowing from that of free speech.162 If private and public whistleblowing are
of equivalent importance, both types of employees should receive equivalent protection through a unified statutory scheme. This approach would ideally avoid cases
like Huppert and Reilly because both officers could rely on statutory protections,
turning their cases into employment law disputes and not constitutional issues. The
Court seems to acknowledge that protection of whistleblowing is a social good, but
one that should be accomplished as most social goods are, through legislation.163
B. Problems with a Statutory Solution
Despite the advantages discussed in the preceding section, not every employee
speech advocate believes a statutory solution is the quickest or most realistic path
to success.164 Proponents of the judicial approach are skeptical about the likelihood
of achieving meaningful protections for employees through statute. Chief among their
concerns are the inadequacies of current whistleblower laws,165 a lack of confidence in
the legislature to pass a meaningful bill,166 and the idea that a statutory solution lacks
the permanence or moral authority of a constitutional, rights-based approach.167
The most widespread criticism of reliance on statutory protections is that the
current patchwork of statutes is riddled with holes that leave many private and public
employees unprotected.168 Critics have persuasively argued that existing whistleblower
statutes are not having their intended effect.169 Existing statutes have been criticized
for being too narrow.170 Many current statutes only protect speech made to certain
160
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authorities.171 Employees who complain to the wrong person may learn far too late
that there are no legal protections available to them.172 Some statutes restrict whistleblowing to complaints made to governmental or other external authorities, without
providing any protection for internal complaints.173 Problematically, this creates an
incentive for whistleblowers to publicly report some activities that could be taken care
of internally at less harm to the company.174
Others have pointed out that many whistleblower complaints suffer from timeconsuming procedural hurdles.175 Problems for private whistleblowers include statutes
of limitations that are too short, complex procedures for bringing a claim, and inadequate remedies.176 These procedural obstacles are even greater for federal employees
than for state and local government officials.177 The numerous gaps in the current
statutes make protections for most employees illusory. In some cases even the illusion
of protection is missing, as scholars have noted that SOX, for example, has been largely
ineffective in increasing the number of whistleblower anti-retaliation claims.178
Despite the inadequacy of current statutory protections, there is no reason to believe that a comprehensive federal employee speech statute would be unable to improve
on the existing statutory framework. The flaws in the existing statutory models arguably support the use of statutory protections. Existing statutes have provided valuable
information as to which provisions are most effective and what additional issues are
171
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raised. The legislative process will allow the current models to be thoroughly studied
in order to combine the best elements in a comprehensive bill. A statute can also be
amended as needed in an ongoing attempt to improve employee speech protections.
The difficulties of the issue counsel a trial and error approach better suited for statutory
rather than constitutional solutions.
The difficulty of passing comprehensive legislation to protect employee speech
poses a second argument against forgoing First Amendment protections for a statutory
solution. One of the main purposes of such a law would be to protect those employees
who speak out against government corruption and increase transparency in government
decision making.179 This invites the inherent paradox present whenever a governmental
body is asked to regulate itself.180 Some critics lack faith that truly effective statutory
schemes can ever be passed due to this conflict of interests, and believe that is precisely
what makes the courts a better check on the power of government employers.181
However, considering federal employees are the only population currently protected
by a comprehensive whistleblower statute,182 this conflict of interest does not appear
to have been an obstacle to legislation to this point.
A more serious concern is whether legislators will have the fortitude to pass meaningful protections for private employees over the certain protests and lobbying of
private employers. This concern can be partly mitigated by the ability to focus legislation on the social need for whistleblowing as opposed to the broader concept of employee speech rights in general. Though corporate interests will assuredly be motivated
to limit employee protections, there is evidence that such protections can overcome
employer objections through broad public support. SOX, despite its flaws, demonstrated that Congress is willing to stand up to a powerful industry—in that case the
securities industry—on behalf of whistleblowers.183 Though some may claim that SOX
was a one-time event enabled by the fallout from the Enron and WorldCom scandals,184
the current economic collapse, including such corporate malfeasance as the Bernie
Madoff scandal,185 and the current employment market should provide a public mood
that is similarly receptive to broader protections for employees. Despite what could be
described as favorable social conditions for whistleblower legislation, there will always
be those who argue that it is easier to gain the vote of five justices than the majority
of representatives and senators required to pass comprehensive statutory reform.
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Finally, a statutory solution lacks the permanence of constitutional protections,186
and leaves unsettled the question of how a citizen’s rights change while at work.
There are many critics who are concerned not only with policy objective of protecting
whistleblowers, but with the proper reach of the First Amendment.187 A statutory
system would protect whistleblowers and other employees from retaliation, but it would
not untangle the confusion Garcetti, Reilly and Huppert have imposed on public employees’ constitutional rights.188 Further, some argue that treating speech as a right
to be protected by statute detracts from its status as a fundamental right that deserves
the added layer of protection the Constitution provides.189
There are also critics who will argue, as Justice Souter did in his Garcetti dissent,
that statutory protections for whistleblowers should not affect the Court’s determinations of what types of speech are protected because “[t]he applicability of a provision
of the constitution has never depended on the vagaries of state or federal law.”190
This argument fails to recognize that the Court has done so in other First Amendment
cases191 and “when courts’ institutional limitations, or the costs associated with judicial
review, militate against judicial interpretation or enforcement, the fact that other governmental actors and the broader polity have sought to interpret and enforce the First
Amendment ought to be constitutionally relevant.”192
CONCLUSION
As technological advances continue to erode the wall between citizens’ work and
private lives, new limits must be set as to how far an employer can extend its control
over its employees’ speech. Denying individuals constitutional rights at work because
they are “employees” and not “citizens” during the workday becomes increasingly
oppressive as the workday takes up increasing amounts of citizens’ time, and the differences between when a person is at work and outside of work become more vague
and malleable. As the law moves to expand constitutional protections to the workplace, it is important that these protections are applied to all employees and not limited
to those in the public sector. The Court’s decision in Garcetti only highlights the
186
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problem faced by all employees. Relying solely on constitutional remedies to prevent
oppression of employee speech will leave out the majority of the workforce.
The Supreme Court made clear in Garcetti its commitment to what is an unworkably firm demarcation between two spheres of life that frequently overlap, a
problem exquisitely demonstrated by the split between the Third and Ninth Circuit
Courts in Reilly and Huppert. Though the Supreme Court’s reference to the network
of state and federal statutory protections already in place may have contained a touch
of wishful thinking, the inadequacies of existing statutory protections should not deter
pursuit of a statutory solution. Creating federal statutory protections for employee
speech would allow Congress to restore some of the protections public whistleblowers
lost in Garcetti and clarify what employee speech is actually protected from retaliatory
acts. A statutory scheme could also produce the significant added benefit of protecting
private whistleblowers who arguably contribute as much to the public good as their
public counterparts.

